"One World, Different Dreams"

Six foreign activists unfurled a banner on the Great Wall of China today. Scribbled on it was the official slogan of the 2008 Beijing Olympics: “One world, one dream”. Celebrating the one year countdown to the greatest sporting event in the world perhaps? Underneath, the words “Free Tibet” on the same banner was less cause for celebration. The group of six has been detained, and their fates are unknown.

In 2001, there was much commotion when the Olympic Games were awarded to Beijing by the slimmest of votes by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). This self-proclaimed “non-profit organisation” decides who gets the Olympic honour in secret ballots, and has been trying hard to salvage its tainted reputation of being a corrupt club of self-serving internationalists. The Beijing decision did not help improve its image.

Critics cried foul and disbelief, when the Chinese capital triumphed over Toronto, Paris, and even Osaka—which was deemed one of the most hospitable cities in Asia. But rest assured, the IOC said. It will be a clean game, and it will bring great changes to China. To placate those critics who point to China’s poor human rights record, the IOC was adamant that the Games would bring the world to China, and China to the world, and in doing so put pressure on the regime to liberalise. Deals were struck with the regime to allow unprecedented press freedom to foreign journalists in this infamously repressive state, where news is known to be government propaganda and strictly censored.

Thus the Olympic dream began. In the past few years magnificent architecture and landscapes have been erected from the ground up. There is no doubt preparations is right on target to deliver what has been promised the most spectacular Games in history. To borrow those wise words of Chairman Mao, the opportunity to host the Olympics is perhaps the ultimate symbolism showing the rest of the world that China has finally “stood up”. The slogan “One world, one dream” is supposed to capture the spirit of “a great nation, with a long history of 5,000 years and on its way towards modernization, that is committed to peaceful development, harmonious society and people's happiness”. Applaud here.

But the nightmares of human rights and other abuses are far from having ended. A former UNICEF spokesperson and Hollywood began a campaign to dub the 2008 Games “Genocide Olympics”, in the face of China’s continuing financial and armaments support of Sudanese government:

That nightmare is Darfur, where more than 400,000 people have been killed and more than two-and-a-half million driven from flaming villages by the Chinese-backed government of Sudan.

That so many corporate sponsors want the world to look away from that atrocity during the games is bad enough. But equally disappointing is the decision of artists like director Steven Spielberg — who quietly visited China this month as he prepares to help stage the Olympic ceremonies — to sanitize Beijing's image. Is Mr. Spielberg, who in 1994 founded the Shoah Foundation to record the testimony of survivors of the holocaust, aware that China is bankrolling Darfur's genocide?

[…] Whether that opportunity goes unexploited lies in the hands of the high-profile supporters of these Olympic Games. Corporate sponsors like Johnson & Johnson, Coca-Cola, General Electric and McDonalds, and key collaborators like Mr. Spielberg, should be put on notice. For there is another slogan afoot, one that is fast becoming viral amongst advocacy groups; rather than "One World, One Dream," people are beginning to speak of the coming "Genocide Olympics."

Does Mr. Spielberg really want to go down in history as the Leni Riefenstahl of the Beijing Games? Do the various television sponsors around the world want to share in that shame? Because they will. Unless, of course, all of them add their singularly well-positioned voices to the growing calls for Chinese action to end the slaughter in Darfur.

Despite assertions by the Beijing Organizing Committee that the foreign press is being
“treated kindly”, Reporters without Borders begs to differ:

The Chinese authorities promised the IOC and international community concrete improvements in human rights in order to win the 2008 Olympics for Beijing. But they changed their tone after getting what they wanted. For example, then deputy Prime Minister Li Lanqing said, four days after the IOC vote in 2001, that “China’s Olympic victory” should encourage the country to maintain its “healthy life” by combatting such problems as the Falungong spiritual movement, which had “stirred up violent crime.” Several thousands of Falungong followers have been jailed since the movement was banned and at least 100 have died in detention.

A short while later, it was the turn of then Vice-President Hu Jintao (now president) to argue that after the Beijing “triumph,” it was “crucial to fight without equivocation against the separatist forces orchestrated by the Dalai Lama and the world’s anti-China forces.” In the west of the country, where there is a sizeable Muslim minority, the authorities in Xinjiang province executed Uyghurs for “separatism.” Finally, the police and judicial authorities were given orders to pursue the “Hit Hard” campaign against crime. Every year, several thousand Chinese are executed in public, often in stadiums, by means of a bullet in the back of the neck or lethal injection.

And so does the Committee to Protect Journalists, which warned of a

[…] yawning gap between China’s poor press freedom record and the promises made in 2001 when Beijing was awarded the Olympic Games. The International Olympic Committee awarded the 2008 Games to the Chinese capital based on assurances that authorities would allow the media “complete freedom,” and that they would apply “no restrictions” to coverage. While the government has eased some travel and interview rules that apply to foreign journalists, it continues to impose severe constraints on the domestic press. Chinese journalists are in jail. Vast censorship rules are in place. Harassment, attacks, and threats occur with impunity. China has fallen short thus far in its pledge to the international community.

To echo this, Amnesty International reports:

growing crackdown on Chinese human rights activists and journalists as well as the continued use of ‘Re-education through Labour’ (RTL) and other forms of detention without trial. Official statements suggest that the Olympics are being used to justify such repression in the name of ‘harmony’ or ‘social stability’ rather than acting as a catalyst for reform. […] the image of the Olympics continues to be being tarnished by ongoing reports of the ‘house arrest’, torture or unfair trial of Chinese activists and the extension of systems for detention without trial in Beijing as part of the city’s ‘clean-up’ ahead of August 2008. If the authorities fail to take significant action to reform such practices, reports of abuses are likely to increase as the Olympics approach with adverse publicity potentially affecting not only China, but other stakeholders in the Olympic movement, including the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the corporate sponsors of the Games.

And so does Human Rights Watch, which wrote:

On paper, the temporary regulations appear to free foreign correspondents from a decades-old regulatory handcuff of time-consuming and rarely granted foreign ministry approval for interviews and reporting trips o[…]. However, the new latitude granted by the temporary regulations is conditioned on being “in conformity with Chinese laws and regulations.” This is problematic, as many Chinese laws and regulations limit free expression. The continuing applicability of these other laws and regulations and the lack of independence of the judiciary limit the chances that the temporary regulations will be enforced, or enforceable.

[…]In addition, foreign journalists must still apply for rarely-granted official permits for reporting visits to Tibet. Worse, many say that they are often harassed, detained, and intimidated by government and state security officials in the course of their reporting activities. More disturbingly, such treatment is increasingly being meted out by threatening and occasionally violent groups whom journalists often suspect to be plainclothes police personnel […]

Human Rights in China wrote that the Chinese regime is (ab)using the Olympics to package and advertise its strengths and overshadow its failings. Stories are being revealed of small children driven to the brink all in the name of “Honour for the Nation”. Further, news reports that have leaked out of the country report that Olympic merchandise are being produced by child labour. Whereas big multinationals stand to reap billions in profits from selling their shoes, clothes, puppets and pens at exuberant prices, workers are being forced to work long hours in poor conditions:

Yet the Olympics movement, particularly the International Olympics Committee, has refused to acknowledge that labour violations in their supply chain exist, and that they need to take responsibility to create an ethical marketing and licensing program in the face of these contraventions. […] Even though the IOC Code of Ethics stating clearly that “The Olympic parties must not be involved with firms or persons whose activity is inconsistent with the principles set out in the Olympic Charter”, the IOC refuses to accept responsibility for even the most minimum adherence to basic labour standards in the production and sportswear bearing the Olympic Games logo. […] The IOC has consistently favoured an approach of denial and rebuttal of claims that it address the need for oversight and responsibility in the production of Olympic logo goods.

And yet, despite all these well-founded criticisms and misgivings, the IOC President just yesterday praised Beijing for its “excellent work”. “One world, one dream”, indeed.

Ironic. The UK (and others) can proudly announce their intention to boycott sports competitions in Zimbabwe, yet when it comes to China, a regime perhaps just as, if not more, oppressive and obnoxious, they welcome it with open arms. What kind of signal did the IOC want to send to similarly brutal governments out there when it gave China the gift of the Olympics? That it’s alright to torture your own people, and send them into gulags where they slave away manufacturing cheap goods? That it’s alright to stifle dissent and arbitrarily detain opposition, and to censor the internet and all negative news about the country? And that’s it’s perfectly alright to invade Tibet and destroy the last vestiges of that country’s cultural and religious heritage? Or perhaps the IOC wanted to condone China with its continuous war-mongering and warnings of invading Taiwan?

Whatever the message, whatever the motivation or incentive, in a year’s time fanfare and fireworks will fly over Beijing, as the city, and the country, proudly invites the world to see. See the proud achievements and progress it has made in recent years, see the beauty and magnificence of this up-and-coming economic and political dragon that has now reawakened, and see how civilised people have become through the ‘no spitting’ campaigns.

But there are things that the regime does not want you to see… people who have been forcibly rounded up and sent away to make room for the Olympic dream, the people who spoke out too loudly and are now being persecuted in prison… and those resisting in silence of one day seeing their own country freed from occupation and intimidation.

Look.

And you will see.

More cartoons here.

"Taiwan applies for UN membership"

I've not written about politics for a while, partly because I've had so much other things to do, but this is one issue that really gets to me.

It may be boring, but this is something I'm been reading and writing about since I was young:
the issue of Taiwan! I was born there, and even though I only lived there a few years, I still few somewhat connected to that country. Basically, despite the fact it's a fully functioning country in every way possible, it is not recognised by most states in the world as a state. So it is not allowed to join the UN or any international organisation in which Statehood is a requirement.
A gross violation of international law and denial of the rights of the people of Taiwan to representation and security.

The following are things I wrote a few days ago and published elsewhere:

You may or may not (probably the latter) have seen this headline on BBC News a few days ago.

Poor little Taiwan knocking at the doors of the UN once again, and most certainly will be turned away and ignored like the international pariah it is. It's not the first time, and definitely will not be the last. With China wielding the veto power on the Security Council, and insisting that Taiwan is "an inalienable part of the motherland", chances of China ever approving Taiwan's membership is less than nihil.

By any objective standard, Taiwan is a sovereign and independent State, with a properly functioning government, 23 million inhabitants, identifiable territory, and also has the ability to engage in international relations. It is probably the most democratic and politically stable country in Asia, supported by a thriving economy and society. But, alas, it is openly shunned by the rest of the world like the plague, all because of China's propaganda and war mongering.

There are States ripped by turmoil and in which the government have ceased to exist, but they are still part of the family of States and recognised as such. Then there are oppressively authoritarian States that trample on basic human rights and intimidate its own population, but they are part of the UN. And then there are those 'evil' rogue States that flagrantly disregard international law, and even braver others that cause despicable humanitarian tragedies, and yes, they too are part of the UN. Taiwan is none of the above, but cannot even take part in the most basic international conference on matters of universal concern, like human health or the environment, because it is not recognised as a State. The irony.

One reason I study law because I was fascinated with its ability to defend the weak and restrain the strong in a world too often corrupted by the dictates of power and politics. Law’s power lies in its ability to speak back to power. Law’s authority lies in its, certainty, coherence and objectivity; in its ability to be blind and dispense justice on the scales of common morality and in the defence of human dignity.

Or at least in theory. And no where else is it more evident in the international arena. All States are equal, they say, but some more so than others. That is, if you are recognised as a State. If you are not, you are alone and isolated in this so-called international community that preaches equality, justice and universalism, but cowers in the face of hegemony and bullying tactics. Such is the sorry state of the world today.

Below is an excerpt from a paper I wrote at SOAS about the issue of recognition of States under public international law, with a special focus on the question of recognition of Taiwan:

That the proposed idea of recognition of statehood has moved from a constitutive to a declaratory view should, in the light of the Taiwan experience, be reassessed. Taiwan proves the effectiveness, legitimacy or even pragmatic tests for statehood are irrelevant. Instead, the current international order is dominated by an oligopoly of powerful states who can dictate, like the European colonial powers in the 19th Century did, who is allowed to belong and what is to be deemed a state, according to their interests and convenience.

International law revolves around states. A state may exist, and may be able and willing to shoulder all the rights and duties bound on members of the community of states, but the ultimate test of full subject-status under international law rests on its recognition by existing (superpower) states. The situation surrounding Taiwan's statehood offers an interesting overlap between the dominant realities of the ability of international politics to dictate international law, and the idealistic norms underpinned by human rights and peace that international law aims to pursue despite inhibitions from international politics.

Recognition is not a legal obligation, therefore it is often hijacked by political interests and objectively granted or withdrawn to serve certain, mostly that of big powers', status quos and realities. Taiwan’s relationship with its international counterparts is "fraught with ellipsis, indirect statements, and hidden meanings" . Though the international community has argued that the issue of Taiwan and its legal status should be up to China and Taiwan to decide, the nature of the question in straddling so many issues of international rights and duties and the potential impacts on world peace and stability, makes the issue one that is of the international community's concern and need for mediation.

The recognition of statehood is of great importance, because the existence or the lack of such recognition will dictate whether the candidate is deserving of the full protection, privileges and entitlements available in this state-centric world, regardless of whether that world is viewed through legal or political lenses. Exactly because recognition is such an important aspect of existence in the international community, it is also the most controversial, and one in which law and politics often intertwine.

And today I wrote this, after the UN rejected Taiwan's application for membership... again!

A letter was filed by President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan on the 19th of July, directed at UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon. In it, Chen formally applied for Taiwan’s UN membership in accordance with the rules and procedure as laid out under the Charter.

Five days later, President Chen’s letter is returned by the UN Office of Legal Affairs, and the application for membership outrightly rejected. A short statement was issued, rejecting the application. I tried to find the original statement, but it is no where to be found, and believe me I’ve searched in all over the UN website. Like the complete and utter denial of its existence in the world, no hits contain the word ‘Taiwan’.

So, according to news reports, the application for membership was rejected on the basis of GA Resolution 2758 (XXVI), entitled ‘Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations’. That resolution was adopted in 1971, after the UN decided that:

“to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it”.

Here is the joke behind this resolution.

When the UN was established, the war-ally and Chinese dictator Chiang Kai-Shek was allowed to sit alongside the big powers and take China’s seat in the organisation. Years before, his regime fled China to take refuge in Taiwan when the Communists triumphed and took control of China. Cold War politics, and unquestioning US support meant that Chiang’s regime was able to illegally conquer Taiwan and oppress its inhabitants, while at the same time claim that it effectively controlled over the hundreds of millions of Chinese from the tiny island of Taiwan. This pipe-dream and fantasy was able to flourish for some 26 years, while the Communist regime in Beijing was shunned aside and treated as persona non grata.

After almost three decades of political wrangling and protests, spearheaded by the Soviet Union, the UN finally realised it was unrealistic that the Chiang regime ever represented China.

Hence Resolution 2758—an infamous resolution that effectively admitted that for so many decades the UN had been so blind and foolish, and allowed itself to be so politically manipulated and deceived to have Chiang Kai-Shek and his cronies unlawfully occupy China’s seat in the UN.

Goodbye Chiang…

But what does this have to do with Taiwan? Nothing. Nothing at all. All Resolution 2758 did was restore the rightful and legitimate seat of the People’s Republic of China, period. There was complete silence regarding the status of Taiwan and to whom the territory belonged to. And this silence has existed since the end of World War II, when Taiwan was put under temporary control of the Allied Forces. The US and UK at the time had publicly declared that the status of this one-time Japanese colony was “undetermined”. The status of the island, and future of its people, had to be decided eventually at a peace conference or within the UN system. But that was that. All talk.

When China rightfully assumed its place in the UN, it reiterated and continues to reiterate that Taiwan is part of China. It makes claims on the basis of the historical, cultural, linguistic bonds between China and Taiwan, but none of it is founded in law or reality. Any attempt to bring the issue of Taiwan to discussion is met with stiff opposition or the veto.

The truth is China does not have any legal title to claim sovereignty over the territory of Taiwan. Nor does China have any control, effective or otherwise, over the territory and its 23 million people. If it did, it would not have to constantly threaten invasion and war, because it could just legitimately march in, hoist its red flag and establish its dictatorial regime there, and no one would protest. If China did control and legitimately own Taiwan, it would not have to constantly warn of economic retaliation and other “severe consequences” whenever other States deal with Taiwan.

So why was the application for membership in the UN rejected on the basis of Resolution 2758? A completely flawed argument lacking in any basis or reason. Just like that, dismissed without any discussion or whatsoever in the General Assembly or the Security Council, as is required by law under the UN Charter (Art. 4(2)). I’d not be surprised if Mr Ban was somehow pressured (or bribed) by China to dismiss the application as soon as it was filed. And this coming directly from the UN’s Office of Legal Affairs.

States like Tuvalu, with its meagre 10,000 people, and States like North Korea, with its open defiance of international norms, can all become and stay members of the UN. Yet, a country like Taiwan, with more a larger population than two-thirds of UN members, is barred time and again due to such inexcusable manipulations of the law. Those judges in the Admissions Case, who unequivocally and overwhelming held that admission into the world’s primary universal organisation cannot “juridically” be “dependent on conditions not expressly provided by Article 4(1)” of the Charter must be spinning in their graves.

I leave you with the words from the original application filed by Mr Chen… despite the invocation of the ‘international community’ (which as you know I loathe), they speak more than I, or justice, ever could.

“The international community of today chooses to disregard the efforts of Taiwan's 23 million people in their pursuit of dignity and peace. It would rather ask a country that advocates the universal values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and peace to submissively remain silent when its identity is denied and security threatened. Whereas globalization draws nations and peoples around the world closer under shared interests and concerns, the United Nations has long excluded Taiwan from participation, erecting a wall against it and placing it in political apartheid. Such unfair treatment towards Taiwan is incomprehensible and unbearable.

The people living on the beautiful land of Taiwan desire their nation to become a member of the international community and make greater contributions to world peace and prosperity. I, as President, have been given a mandate by the people of Taiwan, and therefore have the responsibility to see realized their aspirations. Participation in the United Nations is a fundamental right of the people of Taiwan. The absence of Taiwan in the United Nations creates a gap in the global network for cooperation, goes against the ideals and notion of justice upheld by the United Nations, and moreover is ironic in light of the UN's principle of universality”.

--

To find out more, read this.

And here's a video clip by the Taiwanese heavy metal group ChthoniC...
I'm not normally a fan of this type of music, but the music and lyrics does say a lot about Taiwan's international isolation in the world today...

UNlimited TAIWAN Short Film (Not Music Video)

Aan mijn Profiel Toevoegen | Meer Video's



OK!!!
I'll stop here before you fall asleep.... if you're still awake!

Scramble for Africa

A conference of African leaders in Beijing late last year confirmed China’s ‘clout’ on the continent, whereas the Chinese president Hu Jintao is once again on a whirlwind trip throughout Africa. A cause for concern, echoing warnings by South African president Mbeki who recently suggested China-Africa relations were increasingly becoming ‘colonial’ in nature. Here follows a commentary by Jonathan Hoslag on China’s recent advances in Africa.

Africa as the mine of the world

“The pact that China sealed with the political elites of Africa [does not bring benefit] to the majority of the African population. Even though various countries enjoy higher prices for natural resources and China does invest more than the European countries as a whole, it confirms Africa in its role as the mine of the world, without receiving the chance to develop in other sectors. Around 90% of Chinese imports consists of natural resources. The excessive industrialization of the Asian giant increasingly led to a social bloodbath in hundreds of African factories. It also does not add to the optimis that Chinese companies implement their projects in Africa largely with Chinese workers: own workforce first!

China undermines the chance of democracy

Due to the fact that Beijing strengthens the political elites in their position as guardians of the continent, the chance of democracy and good governance appears to be further undermined. China hinders the existence of an assertive middle class. It breathes new life into the patronage networks of [cronies]. Because Chinese diplomats continuously stand in the way in the Security Council of the United Nations, dishonest [people] can roam unpunished. Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese president, can [thank] China that he is still in his seat. Not only did the People’s Republic block international sanctions, it also provided Khartoum with weapons that were employed in the suppression of rebels in the south of the country and in the cleansing operations in the province of Darfur. Even though the Chinese government continuously staunchly denies it, more and more weapons are arriving in all sorts of [conflict zones]: the Congo, Ehtiopia, Zimbabwe, and so on.

Guerrilla fighter in a suit

Chinese diplomacy behaves like a guerrilla fighter in a suit. It realises it is no match against the big players, but it conveniently targets their weak spots. Africa is again at the frontline of an international politics based on bids. The People’s Republic is determined in its plan to strengthen its influence, and is being followed in her ‘scramble’ by countries like India. Europe and the United States do not get out of their way, and hang onto their energy interests and strategic considerations. The result is a downward spiral in which Africa will again end up [as the underdog].

CNN interview with President Chen

Love him or hate him, President Chen Shui-bian does have a few things to say:

about the 988 Chinese missiles pointed at Taiwan... about the recent embezzlement scandals... and about the denial of Taiwan's 23million people's "collective rights" by the UN.

Talk Asia: Chen Shui Bian Part 01 (01.29.07, 8:30)

Talk Asia: Chen Shui Bian Part 02 (01.29.07, 7:30)

Talk Asia: Chen Shui Bian Part 03 (01.29.07, 6:10)

China shoots down satellite

Worrying news carried by several international media that China has the ability to shoot down objects in space. This means the country has the potential to shoot to spy or other communications satellites, which will give it an advantage in the event of a conflict with, for example, the US over Taiwan.

The test of an antisatellite weapon, which the government refused to either confirm or deny today, despite widespread press coverage and diplomatic inquiries, was perceived by regional experts as China’s most provocative military action since it test-fired missiles off the coast of Taiwan more than a decade ago. Unlike the Taiwan exercise, the main intended audience this time was the United States, the sole superpower in space.

Through energetic diplomacy, generous foreign aid and a number of lengthy policy-study white papers, Chinese officials have taken pains in recent yeas to present their country in a very different light: as a new kind of global power that, unlike the United States, has only good will toward other nations.

But some analysts said the antisatellite test showed that the reality is murkier than that. China has surging national wealth, legitimate defense concerns, and an opaque military bureaucracy that may belie its promise of a “peaceful rise.”

New York Times

Rections from around the world:

[Australian Foreign Minister Alexander] Downer expressed several concerns about the Chinese test.

"First of all, the destroyed satellite's causing damage to other satellites," Downer told reporters outside Australia's U.N. Mission after his first meeting with the new U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

"Secondly, it's well known that satellites have important military applications, as it raises questions about this whole issue of the militarization of outer space. ... The Chinese have always opposed the militarization of outer space, so that's why we look forward hearing what they say about the issue."

Dana Perino, deputy White House press secretary, said Friday that Chinese officials have not yet responded to concerns expressed by the U.S.

"We do want cooperation on a civil space strategy, so until we hear back from them or have more information, I don't have any more to add," she said.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said Tokyo has asked Beijing for an explanation and stressed the importance of the peaceful use of space.

"We must use space for peace," he told reporters. "We are asking the Chinese government about the test."

Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso criticized Beijing for failing to give advance notice to Tokyo. He also suggested that Tokyo doubted the test was conducted for "a peaceful use."

Yasuhisa Shiozaki, Japan's top government spokesman, suggested that China's lack of transparency over its military development could trigger suspicions about its motives in the region.

In Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair's spokesman voiced concerns that the debris from the test could strike other satellites orbiting the earth.

"We have concerns about the impact of debris in space and have expressed that concern," Blair's official spokesman said, who spoke on condition of anonymity in line with government policy. He added "the manner in which this test was conducted is inconsistent with the spirit of China's statement to the U.N. and other bodies on the military use of space."

International Herald Tribune

The Pentagon recently warned in a report to Congress that China's military "is in the process of long-term transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to a more modern force capable of fighting short-duration, high-intensity conflicts against high-tech adversaries".

The report also noted that "China's military expansion is already such as to alter regional military balances. Long-term trends in China's strategic nuclear forces modernisation, land and sea-based access denial capabilities, and emerging precision-strike weapons have the potential to pose credible threats to modern militaries operating in the region".

BBC News Online

But as the BBC points out, the US alarm at the Chinese anti-satellite test smacks of hypocrisy:

But on the issue of space weapons, the US certainly risks the charge of hypocrisy.

The US has also been carrying out research on lasers that could knock out enemy satellites and the Bush administration has repeatedly ruled out the idea of a global treaty banning putting weapons in space.

Only last August, President Bush laid out a new US national space policy which said Washington would "preserve its rights, capabilities and freedom of action in space" and "dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so".

It also threatened to "deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests".

To some extent the announcement of that policy was clearly a response to a perceived threat from China as well as an attempt to preserve the current US advantage in space.

It may be that last week's test is an attempt by China to push back at the US and put pressure on Washington to consider negotiating a treaty to ban weapons in space.

“China’s human rights deteriorating”

No, no surprise. But as the new Human Rights Watch 2007 Report on China says:

Authorities greeted rising social unrest—marked at times by violent confrontation between protesters and police—with stricter controls on the press, internet, academics, lawyers, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

[…]

The Chinese government continues to use a vast police and state security apparatus to enforce multiple layers of controls on critics, protesters, and civil society activists. Such controls make actual arrests—which draw unwanted international attention—less necessary in silencing critics.

The system includes administrative and professional pressures, restrictions on domestic and foreign movements, covert or overt tapping and surveillance of phone and internet communications, visits and summons by the police, close surveillance by plainclothes agents, unofficial house-arrests, incommunicado confinement in distant police-run guest houses, and custody in police stations. Many are charged with vaguely defined crimes such as “disrupting social order,” “leaking state secrets,” or “inciting subversion.”

I and others may be able to access this kind of information, but not internetters in China:

The “Great Firewall of China” restricts not only access to the internet, with its 123 million users in China, but also to newspapers, magazines, books, television and radio broadcasts, and film. During 2006, the Chinese government and Communist party officials moved aggressively to plug the wall’s holes and to punish transgressors. Premier Wen Jiabao justified the renewed crackdown, stating that “internet censorship is necessary to safeguard national, social and collective interests.”

Journalists, bloggers, webmasters, writers, and editors, who send news out of China or who merely debate politically sensitive ideas among themselves, face punishments ranging from sudden unemployment to long prison terms. Censors use sophisticated filters, blocking, and internet police to limit incoming information.

[…]

By their own admission, global corporations such as Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Skype continue to assist in the Chinese government’s system of arbitrary and opaque political censorship in an effort to ingratiate their companies with Chinese regulators. Yahoo! released the identity of private users to Chinese authorities, contributing to four critics’ lengthy prison sentences. Microsoft and Google censor searches for what they think the government considers sensitive terms.

On the international stage, echoing concerns I expressed in a paper I wrote:

In 2006 China was elected to the newly-formed UN Human Rights Council. Its candidacy statement asserted that “the Chinese government respects the universality of human rights and supports the UN in playing an important role in the protection and promotion of human rights.” However, Chinese diplomatic efforts have focused on doing away with independent UN investigations, on the grounds that “the internal affairs” of a state should not be subject to investigation. China continues to work closely with the “like minded” group of countries, which includes Iran and Zimbabwe, to roll back important human rights protections. […]

Although the European Union and others continued to pursue human rights dialogues with China in 2006, the sessions produced no concrete results and no further movement toward ratification by China of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICCPR).

Not just China, but the territories it (claims to) control are not faring better in the human rights situation:

Tibet

Suspected “separatists,” many of whom come from monasteries and nunneries, are routinely imprisoned. […]

On September 30, Chinese People’s Armed Police shot at a group of approximately 40 Tibetan refugees attempting to cross the border into Nepal, killing a 17-year-old nun, Kelsang Namtso, and possibly others. The rest of the group fled, though witnesses reported seeing Chinese soldiers marching approximately 10 children back to a nearby camp. The official press agency Xinhua claimed that the soldiers were “forced to defend themselves,” but film footage showed soldiers calmly taking aim and shooting from afar at a column of people making their way through heavy snow.

Xinjiang (East Turkestan)

In 2006, China intensified its efforts to use the “war on terrorism” to justify its policies to eradicate the “three evil forces”—terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism—allegedly prevalent among Uighurs, a Turkic-speaking Muslim population in China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

Under current policies local imams are required to vet the text of weekly Friday sermons with religious bureaus. “Strike Hard” campaigns subject Uighurs who express “separatist” tendencies to quick, secret, and summary trials, sometimes accompanied by mass sentencing rallies. Imposition of the death penalty is common.

Hong Kong

Beijing has vetoed moves toward universal suffrage and ruled out direct elections for Hong Kong’s legislature in 2007 and for its chief executive in 2008.

In August 2006, pro-Beijing lawmakers adopted a sweeping surveillance bill allowing extensive wiretapping—including of lawyers and journalists. The government has refused to specify when it will reintroduce anti-subversion laws shelved three years ago after the largest demonstration in Hong Kong since 1989.

To be fair, this is what China has to say about the HRW report (in response to a question by a reporter):

The organization you mentioned has conducted the so-called watch on China for many years. Regrettably, though claims to watch, the organization always suffers eyesight problems some other times, it wears colored glasses or squints. Since it is deeply biased, instead of out of good will, its reports are often politically motivated with false content

In accordance with the constitutional principle of respecting and safeguarding human rights, the Chinese Government is working on promoting all-round economic and social progress, pushing forward the judicial reform as well as improving democracy and legal system so as to build a equitable, just and harmonious society and realize all-round development of human beings. China's human rights conditions have been constantly making headways. Relevant organizations should face up to China's progress in human rights, take off their colored glasses and view China in a fair and just way. Different countries have different national conditions, so it is normal for them to differ on human rights issue. We are ready to conduct dialogue with other countries on the basis of mutual respect and equality. We oppose to exerting political pressures on other countries under the pretext of human rights and interfering in other countries' internal affairs.

Yes, we are just so poorly sighted and seeing the world in pink and purple.

Welcome to the country hosting the 2008 Olympics!

Related news...

• A blind human rights activists loses his appeal against four years jail for "disrupting traffic and damaging property". Is it coincidence he exposed the horendous background to China's one-child policy and foreced sterilisations?

• How proud China (and Russia) must be vetoing a resolution at the UN condeming Burma's human rights record.
  

EU-China Human Rights Dialogue

OK, due to 'popular' demand I'm posting the paper I just got back.

In short, it's a critical assessment of the rationale, means and effectiveness behind the Human Rights Dialogue conducted with China by the European Union. The conclusions drawn are disappointing, and perhaps expected. China's poor human rights situation has not improved in any way, if at all, despite ten years have passed since the twice-annual dialogue sessions began in 1995. Reasons cited are, inter alia, China's insistence on sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, differing views on what human rights mean and divisions within the Union on how to engage China. The People's Republic's economic and political importance also makes human rights 'dialogue' difficult, if not unrealistic.

Note that the EU is not the only country that conducts such a human rights dialogue. Other countries, like the US, Australia, Brazil and even some Member States of the EU individually also engagement in such dialogue with China about its human rights situation. However, the conclusions and effectiveness are very similar.

Enjoy! : )

Disclaimer: The views expressed are my own, and conclusions drawn from extensive research and use of official policy papers. Please respect my intellectual property rights and cite me if you intend to use any part of this paper.

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Talking about Human Rights:

The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue


University of Leiden

International Relations

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Introduction: EU-China relations

The People’s Republic of China’s economic rise and growing political importance since its ‘opening’ and reform in the late 1970s has made it a vital international player. Whereas relations between the European Union and were officially established in 1975, prior to the 1990s, the European Union’s relations with the People’s Republic of China were largely trade based, established by an agreement signed in 1985.[1] Today, after the United States, China is the largest trading partner of the EU, with trade reaching some €210billion in 2005.[2] Not only does China’s huge population offer a lucrative market for European countries, its permanent membership of the Security Council, as well as geopolitical influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and increasingly elsewhere, means that it is an up-and-coming power to be recognised.[3]

The EU and China both share an interest to build a “common zone of peace, prosperity and stability”.[4] This maybe due to the desire of both power blocs to act as counter-weights against the United States,[5] in building a multilateral system to meet the demands of economic globalisation, and other global security and environmental issues. In sum, the EU has identified the need for a “coherent, coordinated and long-term” strategy[6] to “respond effectively to China’s renewed strength”.[7]

Human rights and the EU’s external relations

Current EU policy toward China is enshrined in the 2003 document entitled A maturing partnership: shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations.[8] This builds on two previous policy documents from the European Commission, and as the title suggests is a consolidation of a ‘mature’ partnership.[9] The approach is “a strategy of comprehensive engagement”, uniting the common positions of all Member States of the Union, so as to integrate China’s increasingly important political and economic role into the international community and “to support its transition towards an open society based upon the rule of law”.[10]

It is this latter component of the Union’s policy toward China that deserves attention. That China’s human rights record is poor is beyond doubt, and of democracy, in the western sense of guarantees of fundamental freedoms and representative government, there is little to speak.^[11] In contrast, the EU has identified human rights and democracy as “fundamental pillars of enhancing peace and security as well as promoting development objectives” in its external relations.[12] The presentation of a benign moral leadership of the Union is founded in the Common Foreign and Security Policy under Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union (Amsterdam), where the EU seeks to uphold the United Nations Charter, alongside developing and consolidating “democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” in its dealings with third states.[13] Express references to fundamental rights are made in association agreements with other states, in which the EU wields the possibility to even suspend development aid and financial assistance where grave violations occur.[14] This ambition to infuse the respect for human rights in external relations is evidence that the EU has progressively asserted its role in championing the very rights and duties of Article 6 not only within its borders, but the world over as well.[15]

These contrasting values between the EU and China led the Commission to admit that:

China is not always an easy partner for the EU […] China’s opening and joining the international community has always been fraught with difficulties and is likely to be so for many years.[16]

Even so, in contrast to the United States, which pursues a tougher approach of engagement coupled with containment,[17] the European Union, and its Member States, pursue a policy of dialogue.[18] For it is through dialogue that the EU aims to reach a “constructive resolution of differences” in perceptions about the scope and commitments to human rights.[19] As former External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten argued that despite a “legal, as well as a moral obligation to promote” human rights, “Europe cannot be 'holier than thou'”.[20]

Two objectives are addressed in the dialogue—the promotion of the rule of law, and the strengthening of civil society. An effective and independent legal system is seen by the EU as essential to develop a society based on the rule of law, and to better protect the rights of individuals.[21] Simultaneously, a strong civil society is necessary for the inclusion of social actors in political and social processes so as to ensure developments towards greater overall openness. It is thus the belief of the EU that economic development is only sustainable with greater “respect for human rights, democratic accountability and the rule of law, as well as a democratic participation of citizens in decision-making processes”.[22] As a result, the EU’s interaction with China is one of engagement, but based on human rights conditionalities.[23]

It is also necessary to establish a forum for dialogue to make the Chinese side aware the reasons why European governments are concerned, and why these concerns cannot simply be ignored. And to prevent individual complaints being ignored, it is necessary for the EU to adopt a common stand in engaging dialogue so that China cannot simply “play off one country against another”.[24] Dialogue is also better than confrontation, because it assures Beijing that contrary to its fears of western imperialism and intervention,[25] the EU is not trying to “sow discord inside China”, but rather trying to constructively bring about change and greater respect for universally accepted values.[26

Dialogue through the multilateral fora

China’s sustained high growth has indeed raised the economic welfare of the social and economic well-being of its immense population. But China’s rising standards of living has proven neo-liberals, who contend that increasing wealth and the development of a middle class will simultaneously lead to pressures for political and civil participation, wrong.[27] The violent quashing of the pro-democracy movement on Tiananmen Square in 1989 propelled serious concerns about the human rights situation in China into a core element of the EU’s and its respectively members’ dealings with the country.[28] China was strongly condemned, and various economic and arms sanctions were imposed.

However, it was not long before the suspended economic and high level contacts were re-established, and by the early 1990s all sanctions, except the arms embargo, had been lifted. Living up to its promise of “raising the issue of human rights in China in the appropriate international fora”,[29] and perhaps in order to deflect criticism that the EU was neglecting human rights issues in favour of economic interests, Member States within the Union began adopting a common position within the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in 1992. Indeed, it is at the multilateral level, within the United Nations mechanism where states representing the west as well as developing countries are present, that can better dispel China’s criticisms that condemnations of its human rights situation is plagued by “selectivity, discrimination or targeting”.[30] For many years, the EU tabled or co-sponsored a series of resolutions raising concern about China’s human rights record.[31] The resolutions, however, were never successful, and after stringent lobbying by China, all were blocked by ‘no action’ resolutions.[32] The Portuguese representative, speaking on behalf of the EU, underlining the frustration of resolutions being blocked, argued that:

“[n]o country was immune to investigation by the Human Rights Commission. Procedural motions like this put in question the right of the Commission to deal with country situations at all. Despite positive steps in China, little progress had been made on the ground, particularly with regard to civil and political rights.”[33]

The 1995 resolution, tabled by France on behalf of the EU, was narrowly defeated by just one vote.[34] Then, in 1997, the EU’s common position broke as France,[35] joined by Germany, Italy, Greece and Spain stopped co-sponsoring the resolution at the CHR, due to commercial interests.[36] The promise of a significant number of Airbus orders, and attempts to curry China’s favour, proved to be more of a concern than human rights.[37] This came despite more ‘principled’ countries like Denmark and the Netherlands continued to table a strong condemnation of the human rights situation in China that year. Those who refused to vote for the resolution were rewarded, while those who insisted in supporting the resolution were sanctioned by China through the cancellation of official visits and business opportunities,[38] thus effectively signalled the end of the EU’s common position at the CHR. Afterwards, the EU began to reassess its use of the multilateral fora to induce China to improve its human rights situation.[39] It was clear that a confrontational approach of tabling resolution by Member States of the Union acting in unity “was rapidly being shown to be devoid of any value”, and that it had instead “been valuable in breaking up the EU consensus and in deflecting serious criticism in international fora”.[40]

All talk? The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue

It was China that proposed the commencement of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue,[41] perhaps “as a way of deflecting criticism and deterring the EU member states from co-sponsoring a resolution” at the multilateral level.[42] Starting in 1995, the Troika, composing of the Foreign Minister of the EU Presidency, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Union’s External Relations Commissioner, has twice a year conducted human rights talks with their Chinese counterparts. The Dialogue has continued till this day, except for an interruption after the insistence of Denmark and 9 other Member States of the Union to table a resolution at the CHR in 1997. The interruption does indeed suggest that China’s motivation to start human rights dialogue with the EU on a bilateral basis may be a means to dampen the pressure as compared to a multilateral arena.

There is little information about the substantive discussions that take place behind closed doors in the twice annual EU-China Human Rights Dialogue. Evidence of sessions taking place can only be gleamed from the press releases by either side, which tend emphasise the success of the meetings, yet no go into the substance of what progress has been made.^[43] There is also the EU’s Annual Report on Human Rights, which does go into some detail about the issues of concern raised, and the response from the Chinese side. Then, there are also various publications by non-governmental organisations concerned with the human rights situation in China, which tend to be very critical of the lack of trasnparency, and lack of any substantial change in the human rights situation in China, despite the continuation of these Dialogues.

Thus the latest EU Annual Report on Human Rights, while acknowledging China’s progress in economic and social development in recent decades, expressed concern that:

[v]iolations of human rights continued to occur, these including restrictions on freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly and association, a lack of progress in respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities, continued widespread application of the death penalty, and the persistence of torture.[44]

Further, as often is the case, Dialogue with China does not lead to much progress, and at times causes China to respond by pointing to the faults within the EU. The result generally is that hopes to conduct Dialogue in an “active, sustained and constructive way” [45] are frustrated:

Familiar replies were given on questions relating to freedom of expression, Internet, freedom of religion and belief including Falun Gong, and freedom of association and the role of NGOs. China raised concerns about racism and xenophobia in the EU. Discussion on the rights of persons belonging to minorities showed little common ground.[46]

Despite the criticisms, China does take note the EU’s concerns on the question of human rights, and:

[a]ppreciates the EU's persistent position for dialogue and against confrontation and stands ready to continue dialogue, exchange and cooperation on human rights with the EU on the basis of equality and mutual respect […]^[47]

From the language, one can see that China responds better to dialogue than conflict, and that it lays important on the idea of ‘equality’ and ‘respect’. China has constantly insisted that it attaches “importance to human rights and made unremitting efforts in this regard”^[48] and often cites the high number of conventions it has joined as evidence of its willingness to live up to its international obligations.^[49] Thus it has ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2001, and signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998. In 2004, the Constitution of the People’s Republic was amended to include that “the State respects and safeguards human rights”, and is thereby recognised as ushering “in a new chapter in the progress of China's human rights undertakings”.^[50] In Beijing’s White Paper entitled China's Progress in Human Rights in 2004, China emphasised the achievements in civil and political rights, economic and social rights, rights of minorities and the disabled, and concludes that:

China will, as always, make persistent efforts in promoting continuous progress of human rights in China and healthy development of international human rights.^[51]

Yet, to outside observers, China’s human rights record has not improved much, if at all. Criticisms of China’s suppression and jailing of political dissidents, poor freedom of press,^[52] lack of an impartial judiciary system and the conditions of its detention system, as well as the crackdown on religious freedom and separatist movements are abound. Freedom House’s documentation of the political rights and civil liberties situation in China since 1996—the one year after the start of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue— and it is apparent that there has been little, or no, progress:

Ratings Timeline (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status)^[53]

Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Rating/ Status	7,7, NF	7,7, NF	7,6, NF	7,6, NF	7,6, NF	7,6, NF	7,6, NF	7,6, NF	7,6, NF	7,6, NF	7,6, NF

Source: Adopted from Worst of the Worst: The World's Most Repressive Societies 2006, Freedom House, available at: . A country is rated on a seven-point scale for both political rights and civil liberties, 1 being most free, 7 being the least free, and assigned a broad category status. In China’s case this is NF, meaning ‘Not Free’.

The lack of progress on China’s part has led Human Rights Watch to call the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue “largely […] an end in themselves, without relevance to on-the-ground changes in the human rights climate”. Further, in line with the criticism earlier that the Dialogue was a way to circumvent multilateral pressure at the Commission on Human Rights, the Dialogue is said to have been used by China to “marginalize human rights, delay making real progress, and keep individual dialogue partners busy pursuing separate agendas and issues.”^[54] Indeed, this echoed the recognition by the European Commission itself, already in 2001, that “dialogue is an acceptable option only if progress is achieved on the ground”.^[55]

Explanations for the ineffectiveness of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue

A number of explanations underline the difficulty of engaging in a human rights dialogue with China. First is the fact that either parties hold different ideas of what the concept human rights mean. Since China’s reforms since the 1970s, the emphasis has been to modernise the country and bring its masses out of poverty, and thus more attention is paid to economic and social rights than the civil and political variant. Development and growth requires stability, and the regime’s survival rests on the notion of “socialist political democracy” with Chinese characteristics which:

[puts] the people first and seeking an overall, coordinated and sustainable development, and strives to promote economic development and social progress to satisfy the people's multiple needs and realize their all-round development.[56]

Indeed, it must be recognised that to ordinary Chinese, these are freer times than they have ever before enjoyed, and in line with the Beijing’s prioritisation of stability before freedom, concerns of the West, or the EU, with regard to the repression of political and civil rights are not much shared.[57] To its defence, China insists it is still “a developing country, and its human rights conditions are in a process of sustained development and perfection”.[58] Further, in line with its attachment to sovereignty and China argues that:

[t]he history and reality of human political civilization have proved that there is no one single and absolute democratic mode in the world that is universally applicable.[59]

Such language thus reflects China’s sensitivity to criticisms from abroad, which is often perceived as “malicious and ill-intentioned”.[60] The constant lecturing of China on human rights “complicate[s] the practice of diplomacy”,^[61] especially when China is less than receptive to the whole conception of human rights as seen from the perspective of the Union. This is especially poignant when China sees subsistence and stability as fundamental principles of its development and ‘peaceful rise’ based on state sovereignty and non-interference.^[62] It should be noted that whenever China is under the spotlight for its poor human rights record, Beijing appeals to the debate whether human rights is universally valid as another means of undermining the criticisms of the EU.^[63] China thus projects itself as a victim of European colonialism,^[64] and a champion of the developing world,^[65] effectively as way to deflect its own failings to pointing to the hypocrisy and pasts of the accusers.

On assuming membership of the newly established United Nations Human Rights Council, China said that the Council “should respect the historical, cultural and religious backgrounds” of different countries, and “attach equal importance to civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other”. Further, the People’s Republic called the Council to work in “an impartial and non-selective manner in order to avoid double standards and politicization, and promote genuine interactive dialogue and cooperation” and avoid the “recurrence of political confrontation prevalent” in its predecessor.^[66] China argued that the body “should focus its attention on widespread and gross human rights violations”, as well as promote the right to development and economic, social and cultural rights.^[67]

Indeed, one could question why other countries, like India or Russia, which are comparably just as influential economically and politically, are not criticised as harshly, whereas China seems to bear the brunt of the ‘West’s’ lecturing.[68] As fair as the criticisms by the EU are, is it not hypocritical to expect change by a country which has been experimenting with reform and opening for three decades at most, whereas European countries took to achieve in centuries? Given the size and complexity of China’s population and territory, the rights to economic and social development really are the primary concerns, whereas the West and EU unfairly have a bias towards the development of civil and political rights.[69] As China has pointed out, despite the frustratingly slow progress in the human rights situation, and though perhaps unsatisfactory to western, or even international standards, there is progress.^[70]

As alluded to early, one motivation for Beijing to initiate the Dialogue was to deal with the EU on an individual basis, rather than multilaterally. This allows China more bargaining power and is able to play off one country within the EU against others—even more so when already at the multilateral level the divisions between Member States became apparent.^[71] Indeed, the shift from the multilateral/UN level to the EU-China Dialogue “channelled criticism of China’s human rights record into a private forum”.^[72] Baker calls the Dialogue “a superb weapon”, which works entirely to China’s advantage. The Dialogue appears to be more important to the EU and its constituent members, because it is evidence that they are raising concerns about China’s human rights situation, despite the apparent differences amongst states. However productive it is, the EU can no longer return to tabling human rights resolutions at the UN-level, for circumventing this was the very reason why China was enthusiastic about the Dialogue in the first place.^[73]

Further, the lack of transparency in the EU-China Dialogue, as well as “diminished international pressure has resulted in the dialogues becoming less substantive”. ^[74] Most notably, the failure of human rights dialogues “to address structural systemic problems in China, such as the lack of an independent judiciary and the use of law for political control and to silence political dissent” and the lack of consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organisations “in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programs” means that in effect there are no effective means of overseeing the dialogue and its intended outcomes.^[75] It is simply unrealistic and ineffective, as many NGOs have noted, that the Dialogue is conducted without the participation of civil society groups, which are invariably have more expertise and are more attuned to the realities and difficulties of the human rights situation on the ground. Thus:

[t]he complexity of the challenges to end human rights abuses and promote greater protections for rights demands multiple levels of intervention by a range of actors in government, the private sector and NGOs.[76]

While the EU speaks of a united and comprehensive long-term strategy, with human rights, though sensitive, as a core component of its relations with China, without the participation and scrutiny of NGOs in the Dialogue, there is little pressure from the public or outside on the individual Member States to adopt a common stance toward China.

That the different states within the EU pursue their individual interests when it comes to relations with China is yet another reason the development of a coherent Dialogue toward China is undermined. For practical reasons, this may be confusing to Beijing. In certain areas the EU has full competence (such as trade), whereas in an issue such as the weapons embargo it is the Member States who have the final say.^[77] The lack of a comprehensive and coherent policy with respects to the CFSP pillar, as well as divided approach and emphasis of different Member States in relations with China substantially plays to China’s advantage, especially concerning a thorny issue like human rights. China has not shied away from playing the differences in Member States to bypass scrutiny of its human rights situation.^[78]

The fact that leading members of the Union, like the Germany and France, are less willing to directly address the issue of human rights when engaging China weakens overall international pressure. As Human Rights in China put it:

Policies on the human rights situation in China should be part of a consistent, principled approach in which all countries are subject to the same international human rights standards, regardless of such factors as their status in the United Nations or their potential as markets.^[79]

Ideally this should be the common denominator of all Member States in their bilateral and common positions when acting in unison representing the Union. Acting in concert is “more helpful to promoting norms consensually rather than coercively”.^[80] However important China is economically, one should not put the human rights issue to the background, like some big Member States have been all too willing to do.^[81] In reality, it is well-known that some members of the EU:

have made little secret of the fact that dialogue is more conducive to the enhancement of commercial opportunities than what has been termed "confrontation" with China on human rights.^[82]

And the bourgeoning trade relations between key members like France and Germany[83] with China means that it is unrealistic to expect those governments to adopt a tough stance on the human rights issue. As has been put elegantly:

[d]emocratic governments will be more reluctant to spend political capital in discouraging their citizens, and their press, from uncovering the less attractive sides of Chinese reality for the sake of maintaining good commercial relations with the PRC.^[84]

In other words, that though the promotion of democracy and human rights “seems to be an important EU policy objective” in its external relations, it is only a part of a hierarchy of interest that is often trumped by “other interests and objectives”, such as security and commerce. Inevitably, as an aggregate foreign policy of two dozen member states, it is unlikely that EU’s approach to promoting human rights and democracy can be “completely consistently […] value based”.^[85]

Nowhere is this division and trade off between commercial and human rights interest more apparent than in the issue of the embargo on arms and sale of dual use technology still in place.^[86] Within the Union, spearheaded by Germany and France which both stand to gain from a lifting of the embargo, there are arguments that given China’s growing economic importance, it is an anachronistic to place China in the same category as Myanmar and Zimbabwe. Other countries, namely the Scandinavian ones, are not so convinced, thus underlining a clear inability to reach a comprehensive and coherent EU policy on the matter.^[87] Even in the Union’s common approach to the arms embargo, it must be noted that the scope of the embargo, adopted under a Council Declaration is admittedly “not clearly defined”, whereby “different Member States interpret the embargo on sales of arms to China in different way”.^[88] This does not suggest that there is an outright ban, and indeed exchanges in military or dual-use technology continue despite the ban.^[89]

The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted in 1998 aimed to lay down criteria “against which Member States assess applications to export military equipment”, including the need to exercise “exercise special caution and vigilance” when aiming to export to “countries where serious violations of human rights have been established”.^[90] From the language, there does not appear to be a complete ban on sale of military equipment; it merely stipulates a responsibility on Member States have self-restraint. There have been attempts to strengthen the code, for the sake of greater transparency and accountability of the exports of individual Member States, but little progress has been achieved.^[91] A number of states, lead by the United Kingdom, want to license and regulate arms sales, and link it to human rights and regional stability.^[92]

Indeed, the embargo has more symbolic value, and to China is a constant reminder that it is still not an equal partner.^[93] Very recently, Prime Minister Wen Jia-Bao, in line with criticisms voiced by the Chinese side since trade and relations intensified with the EU, again rejected attempts to link “economic and trade issues with the so-called human rights issues.”^[94] Amnesty International expressed concerns that despite the EU’s insistence that the arms embargo will only be lifted pending human rights reform, “[t]he Chinese government has yet to present a coherent plan of reform”.^[95] Undoubtedly the embargo is also concerned with the overall security situation in East Asia, and most specifically the fears that China may acquire European armaments to realise the threats invading Taiwan.^[96] There is strong opposition in the national and European parliaments to lifting the ban, due of course to the lack of clear improvement in human rights since 1989, but to the strong opposition from the United States as well.^[97]

In a similar vein, given China’s economic position in the world today, it is unrealistic for one country to “set pre-requests or pre-conditions (such as the human rights issue) for its trade with China”, because China could easily find alternative trade partners who are more willing to turn a blind eye to the issue.^[98] Closely related is the fear of China’s retaliation should a Member State of the EU adopt a too critical stance on the human rights issue. The temporary freezing of economic relations by China in the aftermaths of the French sale of fighters and frigates in 1992 to Taiwan is an example of how dependent members of the EU have become on China’s economy, and an illustration also of how China is able to take retaliatory measures against states that should trespass against it.^[99]

Another explanation of the ineffectiveness of the EU’s human rights dialogue with China concerns the very subject matter discussed. As laudable as efforts to scrutinise and influence China’s human rights situation, compliance is purely voluntary,^[100] and any violation can have little or no impact on the violator state. Especially in a country like China, sanctions hurt little unless adopted multilaterally and unanimously, and as already alluded to, the EU’s trade dependency is simply too great to restrict or sever economic ties with China completely. Resorting to public pronouncements of disapproval or shaming may have even less impact,^[101] especially given the Chinese economic importance and open disapproval of any criticism of what it classifies as strictly internal affairs.^[102] Whereas perhaps the universal standard of human rights and compliance to international guarantees and norms to protect those values are nowadays increasingly used as a yardstick by western countries to measure the standard of ‘civility’ or acceptance into the international community,^[103] China does not seem to be concerned about its reputation.^[104] Indeed, China’s economic and political weight means that it is easily able to bypass critics, for it is unrealistic, and perhaps even undesirable, to try to isolate the country with its immense market and influence in its immediate region, politically.^[105]

The divide-and-rule approach and playing to the interests of individual Member States certainly works in China’s favour, to the detriment of the Union. Indeed, for the EU to have a credible and united stand, regardless of the commercial or other interests at stake, it should not be seen as having a double standard, while on the one hand including conditionality in trade agreements with third states, but on the other hand silencing itself when it comes to dealing with perhaps one of the gravest violators of human rights.[106]

Conclusion

In the latest paper entitled EU – China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities, the Commission noted that despite repeated commitments by the Chinese to reform, “progress on the ground has been limited”. It was reaffirmed that the EU “must consider how it can most effectively assist China’s reform process, making the case that better protection of human rights, a more open society, and more accountable government would be beneficial to China, and essential for continued economic growth”. To do this, the Commission noted that the Human Rights Dialogue should be:

• more focussed and results-oriented, with higher quality exchanges and concrete results;

• more flexible, taking on input from separate seminars and sub-groups;

• better co-ordinated with Member State dialogues.^[107]

In fact, compared to the 2001 Council Communication, very much the same concerns were raised.^[108] If anything, the lack of significant improvements since the start of the EU’s twice annual human rights dialogue with China in 1995 underlines the inability of the EU to effectively deal with an up-and-coming power which is also a flagrant abuser of human rights. However deeply engaged China is in the human rights dialogue, either with the European Union, or with other countries in the world, positive change in the human rights situation can only be ensured if Beijing is committed and willing to implement progress on the ground.^[109]

Some states seem to believe that appeals to moral arguments and persuasion that if China wants to be fully recognised as a fully-fledged member of the international community, it should guarantee the rights of its citizens and develop a more open and democratic society that is receptive to free information and criticism.^[110] Granting China entry into the WTO, or even the right to hold the Olympic Games in 2008 may be symbolic gestures to confirm China’s important status today. Yet critics argue that these rewarding gestures are premature in light of lack of significant improvements in China’s promises to live up to its international obligations.

Despite all the proclamations of successful of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue for the past decade, little substantive progress can be seen on the ground. This the European Union itself has come to admit, and even come to question the effectiveness of such twice annual Dialogues. As explained, these are due to differences between the EU and China on the conception of human rights, as well as difference between the Member States of the Union. These differences play to the advantage of China, in that it may simply shrug away criticism through appeals to value imperialism, or countries that are more willing to conduct relations with China and turn a blind eye to its human rights record at the same time.

The EU’s “[r]elations with China will be a major opportunity and challenge for the EU for years to come”, where success is possible if it is “based on two willing and committed partners”.^[111] A balancing act is how to “encourage and promote gradual change” within China, in terms of respect for greater individual freedoms and reform of the government structure and improvements in the rule of law, but not to do so in an overtly aggressive or imperialistic way so as to provoke antagonism and greater disdain for the concerns of the international community.

The self-identification of the European Union as a liberal-democracy means that in its dealings with others, the Union will seek to “promote those values in their foreign policies as both a reflection and a reinforcement of their identities”.^[112] It is through the EU’s self-perception, as well as perception by its partners in the world as a normative power in world politics that it “stakes its claim to being a legitimate and thus a more effective international actor”.^[113] For the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy to be credible and coherent, it cannot allow internal division and the self-interests of certain member states to trump over the core values of human rights and democracy it so highly upholds. To third states, it would surely be hypocritical if only those small and less significant partners of the Union are preached to and chastised for failing to live up to the expectations of progress in human rights, whereas with regards to China, perhaps the clearest example of how such values are constantly being infringed upon, there is a resort to self-censorship in order to protect economic and geopolitical interests. As former Dutch Foreign Minister van Mierlo put it at the 1997, the year which symbolically marked the end of the EU’s common position at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights:

There is a risk of double standards by the EU towards big powerful countries and smaller, not powerful, countries.^[114]

The incumbent External Affairs Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner recently called for a “new, extended Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)” with China along the lines of the current EU-US partnership in order to raise “this extremely important partnership to a higher level”. She explaining that this is because “EU-China relations political and security issues, trade and economic co-operation, science and technology, environment, and sensitive questions such as human rights”.^[115]
Undoubtedly China’s importance in the world, and as a partner of the EU, will remain vital for the foreseeable future. However, it is on the “sensitive questions” of human rights that will be a test of the EU’s ability to live up to its proclaimed values, and of China’s ability to live up to responsibilities as a world power.

Bibliography

Philip Baker, ‘Human Rights, Europe and the People's Republic of China’, 169 The China Quarterly 45 (2002)

Barbara Brandtner and Allan Rosas, ‘Human Rights and the External Relations of the European Community: An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice’, 9 European Journal of International Law 468 (1998)

Elena Fierro, ‘Legal Basis and Scope of the Human Rights Clauses in EC Bilateral Agreements: Any Room for Positive Interpretation?’ 7 European Law Journal 41 (2001)

Rosemary Foot, Rights beyond borders : the global community and the struggle over human rights in China, Oxford University Press: New York, 2000

Richard L. Grant (ed.), The European Union and China: a European strategy for the twenty-first century, Royal Institute of International Affairs: London, 1995

Tom Grunfeld, `Human Rights and the People's Republic of China’, 9 Touro International Law Review 71 (2001)

Zeng Huaqun, ‘Promoting a New Bilateral Legal Framework for China-EU Economic Relations’, 3 Chinese Journal of International Law 189 (2004);

Jonathan Holslag, ‘The European Union and China: The Great Disillusion’, 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 555 (2006)

Anne Orford, ‘Beyond Harmonization: Trade, Human Rights and the Economy of Sacrifice’, 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 179 (2005)

Randall Peerenboom, ‘Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double Standard?’, 38 Cornell International Law Journal 71 (2005)

Marina Svensson, Debating human rights in China: a conceptual and political history, Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, 2002

Liu Xinsheng, ‘The People’s Republic of China and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’, pp221-238 in Errol P. Mendes and Anne-Marie Traeholt (ed.), Human rights : Chinese & Canadian perspectives, The Human Rights Research & Education Centre: Ottawa, 1997

From principle to pragmatism: can "dialogue" improve China’s human rights situation:a report, Human Rights in China, 1998

Policy Papers

European Policy Centre

EU-China Think Tank Roundtable, EPC Issue Paper No.21, 6-7 December 2004. Available at: .

EU-China Relations-Towards a Strategic Partnership, EPC Working Paper No.19, July 2005: Available at: <http://www.theepc.be/TEWN/pdf/251966322_EPC%20JULY.pdf>.

European Union

Factsheet on the EU and China, [no date] available at: .

EU-China dialogue on human rights, 22-23 January 2001, available at:

European Union guidelines on Human rights dialogues, Council of the EU, 13 December 2001. Available at:

A maturing partnership: shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations, [COM(2003) 533], 10 September 2003, available at:

Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, [COM(1998) 181], 25 March 1998, available at:

EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more Effective EU Policy, [COM(2001) 265], 15 May 2001. Available at: < http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/com01_265.pdf >

‘EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2005/2006’, (13522/1/06 REV 1), 6 October 2006. Available at:

EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities, [COM(2006) 631], 24 October 2006. Available at: < http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/docs/06-10-24_final_com.pdf>

People’s Republic of China

China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2003. Available at: .

China's EU Policy Paper, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2003. Available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20050817/index.htm>.

China's Progress in Human Rights in 2004, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2005. Available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20050418/index.htm>

Building of Political Democracy in China, Information Office of the State Council
of the People's Republic of China, 2005. Available at:

Footnotes

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[1] Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China 1985. It is recognised that there was an earlier version of the Agreement in 1975.

[2] Information from the European Commission’s Bilateral Trade Relations with China website, available at: .

[3] See for example the EU’s recognition of China’s key position in, among others, the Six Party Talks on the crisis in the Korean Peninsula, in fostering development in Africa, and regional stability in Asia through ASEAN: in Press Release of the 2771st Council Meeting of General Affairs and External Relations meeting on 11-12 December 2006: [16291/06 (Presse 353)], pp6-7. See also Chris Patten, ‘For Europe and China, Good News Already and More to Come’, 19 May 2001, International Herald Tribune, available at: <>.

[4] EU-China Relations-Towards a Strategic Partnership, EPC Working Paper No.19 (2005), pg21

[5] Jing Men, ‘Chinese Perceptions of the European Union: A Review of Leading Chinese Journals’, 12 European Law Journal 788 (2001). The author explains that this may be related to the US’ vested strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region, whereas both China and the EU share a common interest in creating a more multi-polar world to balance the US’ almost unchallenged uni-polarity after the Cold War. See also

Zeng Huaqun, ‘Promoting a New Bilateral Legal Framework for China-EU Economic Relations’, 3 Chinese Journal of International Law 189 (2004), pg 205. See also Randall Peerenboom, ‘Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double Standard?’, 38 Cornell International Law Journal 71 (2005), pg74.

[6] Miguel Santos Neves, ‘Towards a common China policy for the EU: A Portuguese perspective’, pp75-88, in Richard L. Grant (ed.), The European Union and China: a European strategy for the twenty-first century, Royal Institute of International Affairs: London, 1995, pg 81. Cf. Jonathan Holslag, ‘The European Union and China: The Great Disillusion’, 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 555 (2006), suggests this strategy seems to be failing, and working in China’s favour, to the Union’s detriment.

[7] EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities, [COM(2006) 631], 24 October 2006, pg2. See also current Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner’s statements in ‘EU-China relations: Commission sets out its strategy’, [IP/06/1454] Press Release, 24 October 2006.

[8] COM(2003) 533, 10 September 2003.

[9] The Commission policy papers are Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, [COM(1998) 181], 25 March 1998 and EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more Effective EU Policy, [COM(2001) 265], 15 May 2001. Interesting to note that within a matter of seven years EU-China partnership has shifted from ‘comprehensive’ to ‘mature’. Contrast this with the assessment of the European Policy Centre, which in 2004 later qualified EU-China relations as “warm and friendly, maturing but not yet fully mature”: EPC Issue Paper No.21 (2004), pg29.

[10] COM (1998) 181. Recently the establishment of the ‘Europe-China School of Law’ has been approved, with the “overall objective of the action is to support the Chinese Government in its efforts to develop a society based on the rule of law”: see the website of EVD, the agency of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs responsible for stimulating international business and cooperation: .The school is modelled on the success of the ‘China-Europe International Business School’ established by the Commission and the Chinese Foreign Trade Ministry in 1994: see EPC Issue Paper No.21 ( 2004), pg34.

[11] Browse the website of Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in China, Amnesty International, Reporters without Borders and Freedom House and the poor human rights situation in China becomes apparent.

[12] EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2005/2006, [13522/1/06 REV 1], 6 October 2006, pg7.

[13] These values are also reflected in the planned Constitution of the European Union, specifically Articles 2 and 3(4).

[14] See Elena Fierro, ‘Legal Basis and Scope of the Human Rights Clauses in EC Bilateral Agreements: Any Room for Positive Interpretation?’ 7 European Law Journal 41 (2001); Barbara Brandtner and Allan Rosas, ‘Human Rights and the External Relations of the European Community: An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice’, 9 European Journal of International Law 468 (1998).

[15] Holslag (2006), on pg571, calls this the EU’s “moral superiority”, and that for China, adaptation to the EU’s external relations approach “is supposed to be not a question of choice but a question of necessity”.

[16] COM (2001) 265, pp6-7.

[17] Peerenboom (2005), pp157

[18] Huaqun says: “The EU believes in the merits of dialogue, in all appropriate fora, over confrontation; the EU and China should therefore tackle their differences in a frank, open and respectful manner”: (2004), pg205. This is phrase an exact copy of one used by the 1998 Commission policy paper [COM(1998) 181].

[19] Ibid.

[20] Chris Patten, Speech at the 56^th UN Human Rights Commission, 27 March 2000, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_00_99.htm>.

[21] See Holslag (2006), where the author outlines the individual approaches by certain Member States of the Union, and how they relate to the EU’s common position.

[22] COM(2003) 533, pg12.

[23] Holslag (2006), pp561-563.

[24] Peter Ferdinand, ‘Economic and diplomatic interactions between the EU and China’, pp26-40 in Grant (1995), pg38.

[25] Tom Grunfeld, ‘Human Rights and the People's Republic of China’, 9 Touro International Law Review 71 (2001), pg84.

[26] Ferdinand (1995), pg38.

[27] Romano Prodi, as the President of the European Commission then, delivered a speech entitled ‘Relations between the EU and China: more than just business’ in 2004, arguing: “Our own experience in Europe shows there is a strong link between human rights and advanced economic growth. Prosperity inevitably brings demands for greater individual freedom -- and not just in the economic sphere -- as incomes rise and a significant middle class emerges.” The lack of progress of the human rights situation in China can be contrasted with the situation in Taiwan, which many liberal scholars exemplify as a model of how increased prosperity spurred by economic development lead to the demands from the up-and-coming middle class for political and civil participation, which eventually resulted in the inevitable, in Taiwan’s case peaceful, transition from an authoritarian to a democratic polity: see for example Francis Fukuyama, ‘Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon’, 24 PS: Political Science and Politics 659 (1991). Some go far as suggesting that Taiwan’s path of democratisation may be a model for China to follow: see for example, Yu Jie, ‘Taiwan’s democracy movements can be a precedent for the Mainland’ (2004), who also outlines the history of Taiwan’s peaceful political transition, available at: .

[28] Philip Baker, ‘Human Rights, Europe and the People's Republic of China’, 169 The China Quarterly 45 (2002), pp50-51.

[29] Factsheet on the EU and China, Annex I, ‘Declaration on China’, adopted 27 June 1989.

[30] Rosemary Foot, Rights beyond borders : the global community and the struggle over human rights in China, Oxford University Press: New York, 2000, pg171; Liu Xinsheng, ‘The People’s Republic of China and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’, pp221-238 in Errol P. Mendes and Anne-Marie Traeholt (ed.), Human rights : Chinese & Canadian perspectives, The Human Rights Research & Education Centre: Ottawa, 1997, pg235.

[31] Foot (2000), pp171, 188-189. As Peerenboom (2005) notes, 11 resolutions were tabled at the UN Commission on Human Rights since 1990, but none were successful: pg72.

[32] Baker (2002), pg52. One tactic by China was to appeal to the developing countries and label the tabled resolutions as an attack on the right to development of the South by supposed universal values of human rights imposed by the North: see Foot (2000), pp192, 206; Peerenboom (2005), pp151-152.

[33] ‘No action motion’ in Commission on Human Rights adopted in 18 April 2000, [HR/CN/00/51].

[34] Baker (2002), pp53-54; Foot (2000), pg177.

[35] One reason offered by the French was that as early as 1994, the United States had not refused China Most Favoured Nation Status despite the recentness of the Tiananmen Incident: see Foot (2000), pp159-160; 193-194.

[36] Ibid., pp197-198.Baker (2002), pp55-56 For the resolution itself, see E/CN.4/1997/L.91.

[37] From principle to pragmatism: can "dialogue" improve China’s human rights situation: a report, Human Rights in China, 1998, pg3; Baker (2002), pg56.

[38] Foot (2000), pp22, 204; Holslag (2006), pg559.

[39] Part of the reason is because it was felt that the commencement of the EU-China Human Rights dialogue meant that sponsoring a resolution at the UN level was unnecessary. Further, it was believed that it was better to adopt a common position within the CHR, rather than have some voting in favour, some not: see Baker (2002), pg57. See also Human Rights in China (1998), pg27.

[40] Baker (2002), pg63.

[41] EU-China Human Rights Dialogue Seminar, Beijing (June20+21) 2005, available at: . See also Foot (2000), pg166, who suggests that the call by China for human rights dialogue with other countries was more of a show-case significance.

[42] Baker (2002), pg58; Foot (2000), 23.

[43] Human Rights in China (1998), pg6.

[44] ‘EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2005/2006’, [13522/1/06 REV 1], 6 October 2006, pg36. Specific campaigns targeting priority concerns of the EU with regard to China include: freedom of expression, rights of women, promotion and protection of the integrity of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. On pg56, it is pointed out that “[t]he vast majority of all known executions occurred in China (at least 1 770 executions)”.

[45] Ibid., pg227.

[46] Ibid., pg38.

[47] China's EU Policy Paper, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2003. [Emphasis mine]. See also Peerenboom (2005), pg81.

[48] China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2003.

[49] Building of Political Democracy in China, Information Office of the State Council
of the People's Republic of China, 2005, specifically ‘Section VII. Respecting and Safeguarding Human Rights’.

[50] Ibid. Holslag (2006) calls gestures like this, and the implementation of village level elections, merely “s just a political means, not an end”, in that they are ways for the Beijing regime “at maintaining the political monopoly of the Party, not yielding it”: pg575.

[51] China's Progress in Human Rights in 2004 (2005). See also Xinsheng (1997).

[52] Reporters Without Borders ranks China’s press freedom as 163 out of 168 countries in 2006. In the past four years, China’s ranking is similarly at the bottom of the league. See .

[53] Adopted from Worst of the Worst: The World's Most Repressive Societies 2006, Freedom House, available at: .

[54] Letter to the Prime Minister of Finland & EU

Members, 9 September 2006, Human Rights Watch, available at: . See also Amnesty International briefing on human rights concerns in China: EU-China Summit – 9 September 2006, Amnesty International EU Office, 9 September 2006, available at: <http://www.amnesty-eu.org/static/documents/2006/AI_Briefing_EU_China_summit_0906.pdf>.

[55] COM(2001) 265, pg11. Compare this with the statement of former External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten in 2000, questioning the effectiveness of human rights dialogue at the UN Commission on Human Right: “[…] if the public continues to read about closed churches and political arrests, about continuing capital punishment and censorship, they will rightly wonder what is being achieved by all those allegedly 'full and frank' exchanges of views”: Speech at the 56^th UN Human Rights Commission, 27 March 2000, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_00_99.htm>.

[56] Building of Political Democracy in China (2005).

[57] Peerenboom (2005), pp75, 80.

[58] China's Progress in Human Rights in 2004.

[59] Building of Political Democracy in China (2005). See also Xinsheng (1997), pp229-230.

[60] Marina Svensson, Debating human rights in China: a conceptual and political history, Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, 2002, pg312.

[61] Rosemary Foot, Rights beyond borders : the global community and the struggle over human rights in China, : Oxford University Press: New York, 2000, pg1.

[62] In her lecture on ‘Chinese observations on International Law’ organised by the International Criminal Law Network on 1 November 2006, the Chinese Ambassador to the Netherlands Her Excellency Hanqin Xue repeatedly emphasised the concept of sovereignty and non-interference, which is also enshrined in the cornerstone of China’s foreign policy based on the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’. See also China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: “China is ready to […] develop friendly relations of cooperation with all the countries on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” See also Kay Moeller, ‘Chinese risks: nationalism versus integration in Beijing’s foreign relations’, pp9-25 in Grant (1995), pp13-14.; EPC Issue Paper No.21 (2004), pg5; Peerenboom (2005), pg81.

[63] Foot (2000), 12-14.

[64] Svensson (2002), pg313. Such references to the past and associations with the current human rights criticism from the west is also a means to galvanise nationalism, and tied with the Chinese regime’s insistence on national sovereignty. See also Peerenboom (2005), pg74.

[65] Foot (2000), 19-20; Grunfeld (2001), pp84-85.

[66] Excerpt from the official meeting records of the General Assembly on 15 March 2006, available at: .

[67] Human Rights Council, Summary Record of the 5^th Meeting, 20 June 2006 [A/HRC/1/SR.5].

[68] Peerenboom (2005), pp75-76, 148-151.

[69] Peerenboom (2005), pp151-152. These concerns are not just those of China, but of the developing world as a whole.

[70] Grunfeld (2001) argues that there is a bias in the Western media to focus on certain core issues like the lack of freedom of political expression, rule of law and free media, while unfairly ignoring progress in other areas, pp72-78. In short, “the positive aspects of Chinese society today dwarf the negative aspects” (pg84).

[71] Ferdinand (1995), pp35-36. Human Rights in China is also concerned by this increasing trend by countries to engage China on the human rights situation on a bilateral basis, because it is playing into China’s “objective of elminating multilateral pressure”: (1998) pg3 [emphasis in original].

[72] Baker (2002), pg59.

[73] Baker (2002), pg59.

[74] ‘Behind Closed Doors: Bilateral Dialogues on Human Rights’, 2 China Rights Forum 22 (2004), pg24. Available at: <>

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid., pg25.

[77] EPC Working Paper No.19 (2005), pp35-36.

[78] EPC Working Paper No.19, pg37 (2005): “The Member States of the EU must also recognise the critical importance of speaking with one voice on China. Their habit of focusing on short-term, often illusory, commercial interests has to be broken.” See also Baker (2002), pg47

[79] ‘Behind Closed Doors: Bilateral Dialogues on Human Rights’, 2 China Rights Forum 22 (2004), pg24.

[80] Foot (2000), pg7

[81] EPC Working Paper No.19 (2005), pg37: “The Member States of the EU must also recognise the critical importance of speaking with one voice on China. Their habit of focusing on short-term,

often illusory, commercial interests has to be broken.”

[82] ‘Behind Closed Doors: Bilateral Dialogues on Human Rights’, 2 China Rights Forum 22 (2004), pg23.

[83] Though Holslag (2006) notes that since Angela Merkel came to power, there has been a toughening of Germany’s stance on the issue: pg559.

[84] Ferdinand (1995), pg31.

[85] Karen Smith, The role of democracy assistance in future EU external relations, paper submitted at the conference on ‘Enhancing the European Profile in Democracy Assistance’, July 4-6, 2004, the Netherlands. Available at: . She further argues that because of the lack of a common European identity and the democratic deficit within the EU itself, it is hard to develop a coherent and consistent value-based foreign policy.

[86] See Factsheet on the EU and China, which outlines the current arms embargo, including excerpts from the original ban in 1989.

[87] See illustrating comments in ‘Merci, y'all’, The Economist, 26 February 2005: “In a way, on the Chinese embargo, the EU [has] been cacophonous about the justification and the likely consequences, but so far harmonious about the actual plan to remove the embargo. What it has failed to do is to convince its allies that it has thought seriously about the issue of security in East Asia.” See also EPC Working Paper No.19 (2005), pg35.

[88] Factsheet on the EU and China, para.2. See also Holslag (2006), pg563.

[89] One concern is China’s participation and investments in the European Satellite Navigation System, GALILEO: ‘EU China Summit concludes agreements on industrial policy, Galileo and Tourism’, 3 November 2003, available at: . ritics argue that the system has both civilian as well as military uses, and may strengthen China’s military capabilities.

[90] Criterion II of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, adopted by the Council on 8 June 1998: Annex II of the Factsheet on the EU and China. [Emphasis in original].

[91] Ibid., para.6.

[92] Judy Dempsey, ‘Britain wants to tighten rules on arms to China’, International Herald Tribune, 9 March 2005, available at:

[93] See also EU-China Think Tank Roundtable, EPC Issue Paper No.21,(2004), pp22-23, comments by President of China Institute of International Studies Ma Zhengang.

[94] ‘China urges EU to lift arms sales ban’, 10 September 2006, International Herald Tribune, available at: . [Emphasis mine].

[95] EU-China Summit: EU must continue pressing for real progress on human rights in China, Amnesty International EU Office, 2 September 2006. Available at: .

[96] See ‘Old China, New China’ and ‘Merci, y'all’, The Economist, 26 February 2005.

[97] EPC Issue Paper No.21 (2004), pg32; EPC Working Paper No.19 (2005), pg16-17

[98] Huaqun (2004), pg 206.

[99] Ferdinand (1995), pp34-35; see also Foot (2000), pg176. For an idea of the lucrative business deals at stake for a country like France, see ‘Airbus deal with China opens Chirac visit’, International Herald Tribune, 1 November 2006, available at: . Note the issue of human rights is sidelined to a mere “joint statement [that both countries] were committed to the respect of universal human rights "whilst taking into account specific situations".”

[100] Foot (2000), pg9

[101] Ibid., pp10-11. See also EPC Issue Paper No.21 (2004), suggesting “[i]t is, therefore, essential that the Union treats the human rights dialogue as an ongoing priority, but using old-fashioned discreet diplomacy rather than the megaphone, media-driven version […]” and that “[i]t does not require much knowledge of the Chinese to know that ‘carrots’ are likely to succeed, whereas ‘sticks’ can be counterproductive”: pg34.

[102] The backfiring of open condemnation of China’s human rights record can be seen through the United States State Department’s annual publication of ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices’. Starting in 1998, China also responds to the US report by publication its own tit-for-tat version, entitled ‘Human Rights Record of the United States’. See for example the US report on China in 2005, available at: , and the Chinese report on the US, available at: . For more on the fact that US finger-pointing to the poor human rights policy is seen as hypocrisy by the Chinese side, see Grunfeld (2001), pp84-85; Foot (2000), pp243; Svensson (2002), pg310; Peerenboom (2005), pg83.

[103] See for example the conditionality requirements, which emphasise the need to respect human rights, rule of law and good governance, that are placed on aspirant members of, among others, the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Organisation of American States.

[104] Foot (2000), pg11.

[105] Ibid., 191. Holslag (2006), pp569-570, argues that compared to other countries like the United States and Japan, the EU’s average export dependency is much higher, comprising some 49% of the GDP. This makes it unrealistic for the EU, or its individual Member States to try to restrict or cut off economic ties in favour of a moralistic human rights-oriented external policy toward China.

[106] EPC Working Paper No.19 (2005), pg22. See also Foot (2000), pp222-223.

[107] Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament, 24 October 2006, [COM(2006) 632 final], pp4-5.

[108] COM(2001) 265, pp10-12.

[109] Foot (2000), pg26, says “China is deeply engaged with the international discourse on human rights, but full implementations of the core norms is still to come”.

[110] Ibid., pg24.

[111] COM(2001) 265, pg 20.

[112] Foot (2000), pg6.

[113] Mary Farrell, ‘EU External Relations: Exporting the EU Model of Governance?’, 10 European Foreign Affairs Review 451 (2005), pg 453.

[114]Human Rights in China (1998), pg9. See also Peerenboom (2005), pg73.

[115] See the statement of the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner in a press release on 8 September 2006 [IP/06/1161]. [Emphasis mine]. This was affirmed at the latest Council Meeting of General Affairs and External Relations meeting on 11-12 December 2006: 16291/06 (Presse 353), pg6.

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Previously I posted other related posts on the human rights situation in China...

• Let's talk about human rights

• Chinese perspectives

• Olympic Games 2008

• Internet freedom in China under attack…again

• Google IS evil!: Founder of Google admits that cooperating with China was ‘evil’.

• 4 June 1989

• Human 'wrongs'!

• Google eyed

• Chinese censorship:　"The Taiwan That You May Not Know About"

• UN shame (about China's bully tactics in the UN)